OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project – PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES. ACTION 6: 2015 FINAL REPORT. Action 6 of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project identifies treaty abuse, and in particular treaty shopping, as one of the most important sources of BEPS concerns. Taxpayers engaged in treaty shopping and other treaty abuse strategies undermine tax sovereignty by claiming treaty benefits in situations where these benefits were not intended to be granted, thereby depriving countries of tax revenues. Countries have therefore agreed to include anti-abuse provisions in their tax treaties, including a minimum standard to counter treaty shopping. They also agree that some flexibility in the implementation of the minimum standard is required as these provisions need to be adapted to each country’s specificities and to the circumstances of the negotiation of bilateral conventions. Section A of this report includes new treaty anti-abuse rules that provide safeguards against the abuse of treaty provisions and offer a certain degree of flexibility regarding how to do so. These new treaty anti-abuse rules first address treaty shopping, which involves strategies through which a person who is not a resident of a State attempts to obtain benefits that a tax treaty concluded by that State grants to residents of that State, for example by establishing a letterbox company in that State. The following approach is recommended to deal with these strategies: • First, a clear statement that the States that enter into a tax treaty intend to avoid creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance, including through treaty shopping arrangements will be included in tax treaties (this recommendation is included in Section B of the report). • Second, a specific anti-abuse rule, the limitation-on-benefits (LOB) rule, that limits the availability of treaty benefits to entities that meet certain conditions will be included in the OECD Model Tax Convention. These conditions, which are based on the legal nature, ownership in, and general activities of the entity, seek to ensure that there is a sufficient link between the entity and its State of residence. Such limitation-on-benefits provisions are currently found in treaties concluded by a few countries and have proven to be effective in preventing many forms of treaty shopping strategies. • Third, in order to address other forms of treaty abuse, including treaty shopping situations that would not be covered by the LOB rule described above, a more general anti-abuse rule based on the principal purposes of transactions or arrangements (the principal purposes test or “PPT” rule) will be included in the OECD Model Tax Convention. Under that rule, if one of the principal purposes of transactions or arrangements is to obtain treaty benefits, these benefits would be denied unless it is established that granting these benefits would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the provisions of the treaty. The report recognises that each of the LOB and PPT rules has strengths and weaknesses and may not be appropriate for, or accord with the treaty policy of, all countries. Also, the domestic law of some countries may include provisions that make it unnecessary to combine these two rules to prevent treaty shopping. Given the risk to revenues posed by treaty shopping, countries have committed to ensure a minimum level of protection against treaty shopping (the “minimum standard”). That commitment will require countries to include in their tax treaties an express statement that their common intention is to eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance, including through treaty shopping arrangements. Countries will implement this common intention by including in their treaties: (i) the combined approach of an LOB and PPT rule described above, (ii) the PPT rule alone, or (iii) the LOB rule supplemented by a mechanism that would deal with conduit financing arrangements not already dealt with in tax treaties. Section A also includes new rules to be included in tax treaties in order to address other forms of treaty abuse. These targeted rules address (1) certain dividend transfer transactions that are intended to lower artificially withholding taxes payable on dividends; (2) transactions that circumvent the application of the treaty rule that allows source taxation of shares of companies that derive their value primarily from immovable property; (3) situations where an entity is resident of two Contracting States, and (4) situations where the State of residence exempts the income of permanent establishments situated in third States and where shares, debt-claims, rights or property are transferred to permanent establishments set up in countries that do not tax such income or offer preferential treatment to that income. The report recognises that the adoption of anti-abuse rules in tax treaties is not sufficient to address tax avoidance strategies that seek to circumvent provisions of domestic tax laws; these must be addressed through domestic anti-abuse rules, including through rules that will result from the work on other parts of the Action Plan. The report includes changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention aimed at ensuring that treaties do not inadvertently prevent the application of such domestic anti-abuse rules. This is done by expanding the parts of the Commentary of the OECD Model Tax Convention that already deal with this issue and by explaining that the inclusion of the PPT rule in treaties, which will incorporate the principle already included in the Commentary of the OECD Model Tax Convention, will provide a clear statement that the Contracting States intend to deny the application of the provisions of their treaties when transactions or arrangements are entered into in order to obtain the benefits of these provisions in inappropriate circumstances. The report also addresses two specific issues related to the interaction between treaties and domestic anti-abuse rules. The first issue relates to the application of tax treaties to restrict a Contracting State’s right to tax its own residents. A new rule will codify the principle that treaties do not restrict a State’s right to tax its own residents (subject to certain exceptions). The second issue deals with so-called “departure” or “exit” taxes, under which liability to tax on some types of income that has accrued for the benefit of a resident (whether an individual or a legal person) is triggered in the event that the resident ceases to be a resident of that State. Changes to the Commentary of the OECD Model Tax Convention will clarify that treaties do not prevent the application of these taxes. Section B of the report addresses the part of Action 6 that asked for clarification “that tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non-taxation”. This clarification is provided through a reformulation of the title and preamble of the Model Tax Convention that will clearly state that the joint intention of the parties to a tax treaty is to eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance, in particular through treaty shopping arrangements. Section C of the report addresses the third part of the work mandated by Action 6, which was “to identify the tax policy considerations that, in general, countries should consider before deciding to enter into a tax treaty with another country”. The policy considerations described in that section should help countries explain their decisions not to enter into tax treaties with certain low or no-tax jurisdictions; these policy considerations will also be relevant for countries that need to consider whether they should modify (or, ultimately, terminate) a treaty previously concluded in the event that a change of circumstances (such as changes to the domestic law of a treaty partner) raises BEPS concerns related to that treaty. This final version of the report supersedes the interim version issued in September 2014. A number of changes have been made to the rules proposed in the September 2014 report. As noted at the beginning of the report, however, additional work will be required in order to fully consider proposals recently released by the United States concerning the LOB rule and other provisions included in the report. Since the United States does not anticipate finalising its new model tax treaty until the end of 2015, the relevant provisions included in this report will need to be reviewed afterwards and will therefore be finalised in the first part of 2016. An examination of the issues related to the treaty entitlement of certain types of investment funds will also continue after September 2015 with a similar deadline. The various anti-abuse rules that are included in this report will be among the changes proposed for inclusion in the multilateral instrument that will implement the results of the work on treaty issues mandated by the OECD/G20 BEPS Project.
OECD (2015), Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 – 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris.