Categoria: Tributação Internacional

OECD – COMPILATION OF COMMENTS. PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE DISCUSSION DRAFT ON WHAT IS DRIVING TAX MORALE?

OECD – COMPILATION OF COMMENTS. PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE DISCUSSION DRAFT ON WHAT IS DRIVING TAX MORALE? These comments have been prepared by the BEPS Monitoring Group (BMG). The BMG is a network of experts on various aspects of international tax, set up by a number of civil society organizations which research and campaign for tax justice including the Global Alliance for Tax Justice, Red de Justicia Fiscal de America Latina y el Caribe, Tax Justice Network, Christian Aid, Action Aid, Oxfam, and Tax Research UK. These comments have not been approved in advance by these organizations, which do not necessarily accept every detail or specific point made here, but they support the work of the BMG and endorse its general perspectives. They have been drafted by Sol Picciotto, with contributions from Jeffery Kadet, Tovony Randriamanalina and Attiya Waris. We appreciate the opportunity to provide these comments and are happy for them to be published. Introduction. This discussion draft (the DD) updates previous OECD research of 2013 on tax morale in individuals and, additionally presents a new business section, using data from a survey of multinational enterprises (MNEs) conducted in 2016 to discuss business tax morale in developing countries. Our concern is international corporate taxation especially in relation to developing countries. In our view, the inclusion of the data from the 2016 survey of business into the work on tax morale of individuals is unhelpful and makes the draft report incoherent. In addition, there are surprising omissions from the report, particularly the lack of any discussion of the attitudes to tax of key groups such as wealthy people and tax advisers. Our comments will focus mainly on the second chapter on business, and especially its policy recommendations. More generally, however, it is of key importance in our view to understand that the motivation to pay tax is not ‘intrinsic’, at least in the sense of some kind of innate motivation of individuals. Tax is at the heart of the social contract or solidarity of citizens of a state, and there is plenty of evidence that its legitimacy, and hence the willingness of citizens to pay it, rests on notions of tax fairness. We are surprised that these issues are largely ignored in this DD, and will comment further on them below. 15 MAY 2019.

OECD – 2019 Progress Report on Tax Certainty. IMF/OECD Report for the G20 Finance Ministers andCentral BankGovernors

OECD – 2019 Progress Report on Tax Certainty. IMF/OECD Report for the G20 Finance Ministers andCentral BankGovernors. Tax certainty for taxpayers is an important component of investment decisions and can have significant impacts on economic growth. In 2016, the G20 Leaders called on the International Monetary Fund (the IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to work on this issue. Following an initial report in 2017 (the 2017 Report1) and an update in 2018 (the 2018 Update2), the G20 Leaders re-iterated the importance of this issue, noting their continued support for enhanced tax certainty. The Buenos Aires Action Plan called for “the OECD and the IMF to report to Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in 2019 on progress made on tax certainty”. This report provides an update on the work on tax certainty issues and shows clearly that this remains a priority issue for taxpayers and tax administrations alike. Moreover, the work on tax certainty covers a wide variety of issues in both tax policy and tax administration, notably:

FORUM ON TAX ADMINISTRATION. International Compliance Assurance Programme Pilot Handbook 2.0

FORUM ON TAX ADMINISTRATION. International Compliance Assurance Programme Pilot Handbook 2.0. The International Compliance Assurance Programme (ICAP) is a voluntary programme for a multilateral co-operative risk assessment and assurance process. It is designed to be an efficient, effective and co-ordinated approach to provide multinational groups (MNEs) willing to engage actively, openly and in a fully transparent manner with increased tax certainty with respect to certain of their activities and transactions. ICAP does not provide an MNE with legal certainty as may be achieved, for example, through an advance pricing arrangement (APA). It does however give comfort and assurance where tax administrations participating in an MNE’s risk assessment consider a covered risk to be low risk. Where an area is identified as needing further attention, work conducted in ICAP can improve the efficiency of actions taken outside the programme, if needed. This handbook contains information on a second ICAP pilot (ICAP 2.0), which builds on the first pilot, described later in this introduction. This handbook remains a working document and will be revised based on the experience of participating tax administrations and MNEs.

DIRETIVA (UE) 2017/1852, de 10 de outubro de 2017, relativa aos mecanismos de resolução de litígios em matéria fiscal na União Europeia

DIRETIVA (UE) 2017/1852, de 10 de outubro de 2017, relativa aos mecanismos de resolução de litígios em matéria fiscal na União Europeia. Considerando o seguinte: (1) As situações em que diferentes Estados-Membros interpretam ou aplicam de forma diferente as disposições dos acordos e convenções fiscais bilaterais e da Convenção relativa à eliminação da dupla tributação em caso de correção de lucros entre empresas associadas (90/436/CEE) «Convenção de Arbitragem da União») podem criar sérios obstáculos fiscais às empresas que exercem atividades transfronteiras. Criam uma carga fiscal excessiva para as empresas e são suscetíveis de causar distorções e ineficiências económicas, e de ter um impacto negativo no investimento transfronteiras e no crescimento. (2) Por esse motivo, é necessário que existam mecanismos na União que garantam uma resolução eficaz dos litígios relativos à interpretação e aplicação de tais convenções fiscais bilaterais e da Convenção de Arbitragem da União, em especial no que se refere aos litígios que dão origem a uma dupla tributação.

OECD Taxation Working Papers N. 29: THE IMPACT OF TAX AND BENEFIT SYSTEMS ON THE WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION INCENTIVES OF WOMEN

OECD Taxation Working Papers N. 29: THE IMPACT OF TAX AND BENEFIT SYSTEMS ON THE WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION INCENTIVES OF WOMEN. This paper examines the impact of tax and benefit systems on the incentives for second earners to enter formal employment. The paper highlights how various tax design features create greater participation disincentives for second earners than for primary earners or single individuals. As second earners in OECD countries are more often women, these greater disincentives create significant gender-equity concerns. As second earners are also typically highly responsive to work disincentives, these features are likely to negatively impact economic growth. These disincentives stem from a range of policies including the choice of family-based rather than individual-based taxation, the use of dependent spouse tax credits and allowances, and the use of tax credits and benefits based on family rather than individual income. Reform options to address these issues will depend on countries’ existing tax policy design choices. For countries where individual-based taxation is combined with some family-based provisions, reform of these familybased provisions to lessen their impact on second earner work disincentives may be warranted. For countries with family-based tax systems, the introduction of some individual-based provisions could be considered to mitigate the negative effects of family-based taxation on second earner work incentives.Tax and benefit systems can affect men and women differently. Explicit gender biases – where tax and benefit provisions are legally linked to gender – are increasingly rare across OECD countries. However, implicit biases – where tax and benefit systems interact with gender differences in patterns of behaviour and income – remain common. Perhaps the most common implicit gender bias in tax and benefit systems is the greater disincentive often created by tax provisions for second earners – who tend to be women – to participate in the workforce as compared to primary earners or single individuals. This paper examines how tax provisions can exacerbate these disincentives; quantifies the total disincentives created by the tax and benefit systems; and discusses potential tax policy reform options. While tax and benefit systems will also have an impact on the number of hours a second earner works once in employment, and on the mix of hours worked by partners in a family, the focus of this paper is solely on the decision whether or not to enter employment. Concern regarding the impact of tax and benefit systems on second earner work incentives is not limited to gender equity. There are also significant implications for efficiency, income inequality and inclusive growth. Empirical evidence shows that second earners tend to be highly responsive to work disincentives (OECD, 2011), and hence the imposition of substantial disincentives is likely to result in significantly lower participation by second earners than would otherwise occur. This is evidenced by the comparatively lower participation rates of women than men. Reducing disincentives can not only lower these distortions to economic behaviour, but will have a significant positive impact on GDP growth. Increasing second earner participation is also linked to lower income inequality (OECD, 2015) and lower child poverty (Del Boca, 2015). It will also be crucial in helping to address the demographic challenges associated with population aging in most countries. The paper first focuses solely on the tax system. While all income taxes can be expected to discourage work2 , the specific design of an income tax system can affect the exact incentives workers face. (…)  Alastair Thomas, Pierce O’Reilly.

OECD Taxation Working Papers N. 24 – Taxation of Knowledge-Based Capital: Non-R&D Investments, Average Effective Tax Rates, Internal Vs. External KBC Development and Tax Limitations

OECD Taxation Working Papers N. 24 – Taxation of Knowledge-Based Capital: Non-R&D Investments, Average Effective Tax Rates, Internal Vs. External KBC Development and Tax Limitations. This paper extends the tax analysis of knowledge-based capital (KBC) in several dimensions. The paper analyses non-R&D KBC: computer software, architectural and engineering designs, and economic competencies which account for over 70% of total KBC.

OECD releases first stage 2 monitoring reports for BEPS Action 14 on improving tax dispute resolution mechanisms

The work on BEPS Action 14 continues with today’s publication of the first round of stage 2 peer review monitoring reports, which consists of monitoring the follow-up of any recommendations resulting from jurisdictions’ stage 1 peer review reports.

OECD – BEPS Action 14 on More Effective Dispute Resolution Mechanisms PEER REVIEW DOCUMENTS

OECD – BEPS Action 14 on More Effective Dispute Resolution Mechanisms. PEER REVIEW DOCUMENTS. The Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS Action Plan”)1 identified 15 actions to address BEPS in a comprehensive manner. Recognising that the actions to counter BEPS must be complemented with actions that ensure certainty for taxpayers, Action 14 calls for effective dispute resolution mechanisms. In October 2015, the G20 Finance Ministers endorsed the BEPS package2 which includes the report on Action 14: Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective3 (“the 2015 Action 14 Report”). This report contains a commitment by countries to implement a minimum standard to ensure that they resolve treaty-related disputes in a timely, effective and efficient manner. All members of the inclusive framework on BEPS4 (“Members”) commit to the implementation of the Action 14 minimum standard and to have their implementation reviewed pursuant to the Terms of Reference and Assessment Methodology agreed by Members. This compilation contains four documents, namely (i) the Terms of Reference; (ii) the Assessment Methodology; (iii) the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) Statistics Reporting Framework; and (iv) the Guidance on Specific Information and Documentation Required to be Submitted with a Request for MAP Assistance. The Terms of Reference translate the Action 14 minimum standard into 21 elements. These elements are complemented by 12 best practices. The best practices are not part of the minimum standard and thus will not affect the assessment of Members. The Terms of Reference assess a Member’s legal and administrative framework, including the practical implementation of this framework to determine how its MAP regime performs relative to the 21 elements in the following four key areas – (A) preventing disputes; (B) availability and access to MAP; (C) resolution of MAP cases; and (D) implementation of MAP agreements. The Assessment Methodology establishes detailed procedures and guidelines for a two-stage approach to the peer review and monitoring process. Stage 1 involves the review of a Member’s implementation of the minimum standard based on its legal framework for MAP and the application of this framework in practice. Stage 2 involves the review of the measures taken by the Member to address any shortcomings identified in its Stage 1 Peer Review. The commitment by Members to implement the Action 14 minimum standard includes a commitment to provide timely and complete reporting of MAP statistics pursuant to an agreed reporting framework. The MAP Statistics Reporting Framework reflects a collaborative approach for the resolution of MAP cases through the adoption of common timeline for both competent authorities to resolve MAP cases. With effect from reporting period 2016, Members will report MAP statistics based on common definitions of terms, common rules on counting of MAP cases; and common reporting of MAP outcomes based on different categories of outcomes. The Action 14 minimum standard also requires Members to publish MAP guidance that identify the specific information and documentation that a taxpayer is required to submit with a request for MAP assistance. Members should not limit access to MAP based on the argument that insufficient information was provided if the taxpayer has provided the required information. The Guidance on Specific Information and Documentation Required to be Submitted with a Request for MAP Assistance could be used by Members in drawing up their own MAP guidance and could also provide guidance to taxpayers in their preparation of a MAP submission.

OECD – Taxing Wages 2019

OECD – Taxing Wages 2019. The OECD’s Taxing Wages 2019 provides unique information for each of the 36 OECD countries on the income taxes paid by workers, their social security contributions, the transfers they receive in the form of cash benefits, as well as the social security contributions and payroll taxes paid by their employers. Results reported include the marginal and average tax burden for one- and two-earner households, and the implied total labour costs for employers. This brochure summarises the main results of this edition by: l presenting an analysis of the average tax wedge in OECD countries in 2018, the changes from the previous year and the trends between 2000 and 2018 for a selection of household types that are covered in Taxing Wages 2019. l presenting a brief analysis of the net personal average tax rate for a single average worker across OECD countries for 2018. Tax wedge for the average worker Table 1 shows that the tax wedge between total labour costs to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay for single workers without children, at average earnings levels, varied widely across OECD countries in 2018 (see column 1). While in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary and Italy, the tax wedge is 45% or more, it is lower than 20% in Chile, Mexico and New Zealand. The highest tax wedge is observed in Belgium (52.7%) and the lowest in Chile (7.0%). Table 1 shows that the average tax wedge in OECD countries was 36.1% in 2018. The changes in tax wedge between 2017 and 2018 for the average worker without children are described in column 2 of Table 1. The OECD average decreased by 0.16 percentage points. Among OECD member countries, the tax wedge increased in 22 countries and fell in 14. Decreases of more than one percentage point were observed in Estonia (2.54 percentage points), the United States (2.19 percentage points), Hungary (1.11 percentage points) and Belgium (1.09 percentage points). There were no increases exceeding one percentage point and the largest increase was observed in Korea (0.49 percentage points).

Portugal – Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira. Prepare-se para o BREXIT – Para saber mais sobre as implicações em matéria aduaneira e tributária na saída do Reino Unido da UE, sem Acordo

Portugal – Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira. Prepare-se para o BREXIT – Para saber mais sobre as implicações em matéria aduaneira e tributária na saída do Reino Unido da UE, sem Acordo. No dia 29 de março de 2017 o Reino Unido da Grã-Bretanha e da Irlanda do Norte, adiante designado por Reino Unido, notificou o Conselho Europeu da sua intenção em se retirar da União Europeia (BREXIT). Para efeitos de regular as condições desta saída foram encetadas negociações entre a União Europeia e o Reino Unido com vista à celebração de um Acordo de Saída que estabelece um período de transição até 31 de dezembro de 2020 durante o qual, e em conformidade com o estabelecido no Acordo de Saída, o Reino Unido continuará a aplicar, e a estar sujeito, ao direito da União. Por força do disposto no artigo 50.º, n.º 2, do Tratado da União Europeia, os Tratados deixam de ser aplicáveis ao Reino Unido a partir da data de entrada em vigor do acordo de saída ou, na falta deste, dois anos após a referida notificação, a menos que o Conselho Europeu, com o acordo do Reino Unido, decida, por unanimidade, prorrogar esse prazo. Na sequência de pedido do Reino Unido, o Conselho Europeu decidiu prorrogar o prazo para permitir a ratificação do Acordo de Saída, nos seguintes termos [Decisão (EU) 2019/584]: Essa prorrogação deverá durar o tempo necessário e, em qualquer caso, nunca deverá ir além de 31 de outubro de 2019; A saída deverá ter lugar no primeiro dia do mês seguinte à conclusão dos procedimentos de ratificação ou em 1 de novembro de 2019, consoante a data que ocorrer primeiro. Informação mais detalhada sobre o BREXIT, nas diversas áreas aduaneiras e tributárias, na página oficial.