The Chinese government has launched a series of Value-added Tax (“VAT”) reforms over the past few years to align its VAT system with internationally accepted principles, and to adapt to the economic development in China and the world at large, with an aim to modernize the country’s governance system and administration capabilities. On 1 July 2014, the multiple VAT rates of 6%, 4% and 3% (for small-scale VAT payers) were simplified and unified into a single rate of 3%. On 1 May 2016, the Business Tax (“BT”)-to-VAT reform was rolled out nationwide wherein BT on taxable services was replaced by VAT, such that input tax credit could be fully available along all cycles of value chains in order to avoid the cascading effect of BT. On 1 July 2017, the 4-tier VAT rates of 17%, 13%, 11% and 6% were simplified and unified into the 3-tier rates of 17%, 11% and 6%. All the above measures were made to continuously develop a simpler, clearer and more scientific VAT system.
OECD – IMPROVING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN TAX AUTHORITIES AND ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITIES IN COMBATING TAX CRIME AND CORRUPTION
OECD – IMPROVING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN TAX AUTHORITIES AND ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITIES IN COMBATING TAX CRIME AND CORRUPTION. This report was prepared jointly by the World Bank Group’s Governance Global Practice and the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, and was developed within the OECD Task Force on Tax Crimes and Other Crimes. This report has been prepared by Graeme Gunn and Emma Scott, under the guidance of Anders Hjorth Agerskov, Melissa Dejong, and Mark Johnson. Introduction 1. Countries around the globe are facing a common threat posed by increasingly complex and innovative forms of financial crime. By exploiting modern technology and weaknesses in local legislation, criminals can now covertly move substantial sums between multiple jurisdictions with relative ease and great speed. As a consequence, criminal activity such as tax evasion, bribery and other forms of corruption are becoming ever more sophisticated. Meanwhile, law enforcement structures have, in many cases, not evolved at the same speed and the international community has struggled to keep up with this threat. 2. While viewed as distinct crimes, tax crime and corruption are often intrinsically linked, as criminals fail to report income derived from corrupt activities for tax purposes, or over-report in an attempt to launder the proceeds of corruption. A World Bank study of 25 000 firms in 57 countries found that firms that pay more bribes also evade more taxes. 1 More broadly, where corruption is prevalent in society, this can foster tax evasion. A recent IFC Enterprise Survey found that 13.3% of businesses globally report that “firms are expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials”, with the frequency of this ranging across countries from nil to 62.6%. 2 3. The links between tax crime and corruption mean that tax authorities and law enforcement authorities can benefit greatly from more effective co-operation and sharing of information. Tax authorities hold a wealth of personal and company information such as income, assets, financial transactions and banking information, that can be a valuable source of intelligence to anti-corruption investigators. Similarly, anticorruption authorities can provide tax administrations with important information about ongoing and completed corruption investigations that could assist a decision to reopen a tax assessment, initiate a tax crime investigation, or more generally promote integrity among tax officials. The investigation into Brazilian majority-state-owned oil company, Petrobras, initiated in 2014, is a prime example of this. Civil tax auditors played a critical role in this transnational corruption investigation by analysing suspects’ tax and customs data and sharing this with the police and public prosecutor as permitted by law. As a result, officials were able to uncover evidence of money laundering, tax evasion, and hidden assets, and to track financial flows. While criminal investigations and prosecutions are still ongoing, as of August 2018, the operation has resulted in dozens of charges against high profile public officials and politicians and billions of dollars in criminal fines, tax penalties, and recovered assets. 4. However, there remains significant room for improvement in co-operation between tax authorities and anti-corruption authorities. Despite success stories, anecdotal evidence provided by many jurisdictions involved in this report suggests that reporting and information sharing between authorities often occurs on ad-hoc basis rather than systematically. This is reinforced by the OECD’s 2017 study on the Detection of Foreign Bribery, which provides that only 2% of concluded foreign bribery cases between 1999 and 2017 were detected by tax authorities.3 5. These issues are at the heart of the current global agenda. In 2015, the United Nations agreed 17 Sustainable Development Goals, including a specific target of substantially reducing corruption in all of its forms. 4 The World Bank and OECD strongly support these goals and recognise the importance of dealing with corruption and tax evasion at a policy and technical level. In this context, for many years, international organisations including the OECD and World Bank have been active in supporting countries to strengthen their legal and institutional frameworks for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of tax crime and corruption, and the recovery of the proceeds of these crimes. In 2012, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recognised these links by including corruption, bribery, and tax crimes in the list of designated predicate offences for money laundering purposes in its International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation. 5 6. In 20096 and 20107 , the OECD issued two Council Recommendations calling for greater co-operation and better information sharing between different government agencies involved in combating financial crimes. These are supported by the Oslo Dialogue, an initiative which encourages a whole of government approach to tackling all forms of financial crime. 8 As part of this initiative, in 2017, the OECD published its third edition of Effective Inter-Agency Co-operation in Fighting Tax Crimes and Other Financial Crimes (the Rome Report) which analyses the legal gateways and mechanisms for inter-agency co-operation between authorities responsible for investigating tax and other financial crimes. At the same time, the OECD published Ten Global Principles for Fighting Tax Crime, the first report of its kind which allows countries to benchmark their legal and operational frameworks for tackling tax crime, and identify areas where improvements can be made. 7. The OECD continues to advance practical tools and training to combat tax crime and corruption. OECD Handbooks on Money Laundering Awareness and Bribery and Corruption Awareness provide practical guidance to help tax officials identify indicators of possible criminal activity in the course of their work. In 2013, the OECD International Academy for Tax Crime Investigation was launched in co-operation with Italy’s Guardia di Finanza to strengthen developing countries’ capacity to tackle illicit financial flows. In 2017, a sister Academy was piloted in Kenya and will be formally launched in Nairobi, in late 2018. In July 2018, OECD and Argentina’s Federal Administration of Public Revenue (AFIP) signed a MoU to establish a Latin American centre of the OECD Academy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, with the first programme planned for late 2018. 8. The World Bank is also helping strengthen developing countries’ capacity to stem tax evasion. In 2015, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched the Joint Initiative to Support Developing Countries in Strengthening Tax Systems to give greater voice to developing countries in the global debate on tax issues. 9 Through this joint initiative, the World Bank and the IMF are assembling a set of tools and guidance aimed at addressing developing economy needs. As part of this work, the World Bank has also partnered with the governments of Norway and Denmark to launch the Tax Evasion Initiative to enable enforcement agencies in developing countries to more effectively combat tax crimes and other financial crimes. Under the Tax Evasion Initiative, the World Bank is developing a set of tools, including a handbook on tax evasion schemes and red flags for tax investigators and auditors, as well as a methodology for assessing the performance of criminal tax investigation units which is currently being piloted. 9. In researching, developing, and publishing this joint report on the legal, strategic, and operational aspects of co-operation between tax authorities and anti-corruption authorities, the World Bank and OECD aim to complement their existing work and advance the shared objective of improving the capacity of all countries to effectively combat financial crime. Published: 22 October 2018.
IGF-OECD PROGRAM TO ADDRESS BEPS IN MINING TAX INCENTIVES IN MINING. MINIMISING RISKS TO REVENUE. In a world of mobile capital and profits, many developing countries use tax incentives in the hope of attracting domestic and foreign investment. Their effectiveness, however, has often been disputed, not least in relation to the mining sector, which involves location-specific resources that cannot be moved. Tax incentives are also costly, leading many countries to forgo vital revenues in exchange for often illusive benefits. Nonetheless, governments may determine that they would still benefit from introducing tax incentives for the mining sector because of some specificities in their jurisdiction. For example, changing tax arrangements may appear easier to deliver than other investment promoting actions such as infrastructure. In such cases, tax incentives need to be carefully designed to be effective (that is, they achieve their policy objective) and efficient (the policy goal is achieved at the minimum cost to government revenue).
IGF-OECD PROGRAM TO ADDRESS BEPS IN MINING. LIMITING THE IMPACT OF EXCESSIVE INTEREST DEDUCTIONS ON MINING REVENUE.
IGF-OECD PROGRAM TO ADDRESS BEPS IN MINING. LIMITING THE IMPACT OF EXCESSIVE INTEREST DEDUCTIONS ON MINING REVENUE. Globally, there is a major change underway to combat tax base erosion under the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) process. Raising tax revenue is especially important for developing countries. Strong tax systems are central to financing development, and there is increased recognition of the importance of external support in building those systems. While real progress has been made on increasing tax revenues in low-income countries over the past two decades, in many countries revenue remains well below the levels needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and secure robust and stable growth. Like other sectors of the economy, there are tax base erosion risks in the mining sector that can hinder domestic resource mobilisation (DRM), particularly from the operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs). About this practice note Tax systems that provide income tax deductions for interest without making any similar provision for equity create an incentive for the use of debt. While this is true of all industries, this note examines the particular base erosion risks from the use of debt by mining MNEs. This note responds to a concern of many developing countries that MNEs use debt “excessively” in mineral-producing countries (called “host countries” in this note for brevity) as a mechanism to shift profits abroad. This issue was one of the focus areas of the BEPS process. It was also identified as being of high priority for developing countries at an informal workshop on DRM from mining, hosted by the OECD in October 2016. Who is this practice note for? This note is for policy-makers and tax authorities in capacity-constrained developing countries where mining is occurring. Its aim is to assist countries with very limited resources to combat tax BEPS. It prioritises simplicity and ease of administration as policy objectives. It provides references to deeper analysis available to assist developing countries to navigate particular issues on interest deductibility wherever possible. For economic ministers and policy advisers, there is also a wider policy question of how countries strike a balance between tax base protection and encouraging inward investment. The decisions made on policies to limit base erosion have direct implications for the overall investment environment, and these policy issues are highlighted wherever possible. (…)
The report on BEPS Action 14 (Making Dispute ResolutionMechanisms More Effective) contains a commitment by jurisdictions to implement a minimum standard to ensure that they resolve treaty-related disputes in a timely, effective and efficient manner. All members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS (IF) commit to the implementation of the Action 14 minimum standard which includes timely and complete reporting of mutual agreement procedure (MAP) statistics pursuant to an agreed reporting framework. The 2017 MAP statistics are reported under this new framework. They cover all the members that joined the IF prior to 2018.
OECD/GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES – EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON REQUEST. HANDBOOK FOR PEER REVIEWS 2016-2020
OECD/GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES – EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON REQUEST. HANDBOOK FOR PEER REVIEWS 2016-2020. This handbook is intended to assist the assessment teams and the reviewed jurisdictions that are participating in the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (the Global Forum) peer reviews and non-member reviews on EOIR under the second round of reviews (2016- 20). It provides contextual background information on the Global Forum and the peer review process under the second round of EOIR reviews. It also contains the key documents and authoritative sources that are the basis of the Global Forum’s peer review process. Assessors should be familiar with the information and documents contained in this handbook as it will assist in conducting proper and fair assessments. This handbook is also a unique source of information for governments, academics and others interested in transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes. Background 1. Tax avoidance and tax evasion threaten government revenues throughout the world. Globalisation generates opportunities to increase global wealth but also results in increased risks. With the increase in cross-border flows of capital that come with a global financial system, tax administrations around the world face more and greater challenges to the proper enforcement of their tax laws than ever before. To meet these challenges, tax authorities must increasingly rely on international co-operation based on the implementation of international standards of transparency and effective exchange of information. Better transparency and information exchange for tax purposes are keys to ensuring that corporate and individual taxpayers have no safe haven to hide their income and assets and that they pay the right amount of tax in the right place. 2. The EOIR standard used during the first round of EOIR reviews in 2010 was primarily based on the 2002 Model TIEA and the 2005 version of Article 26 of the Model Tax Convention and Commentary1 . To ensure a level playing field and to respond to the G20’s call to draw on the work of the FATF on beneficial ownership, the Global Forum strengthened its EOIR standard for its second round of review by introducing the FATF concept of beneficial ownership in its assessments, along with other positive changes. The Global Forum adopted the revised Terms of Reference (2016 Terms of Reference) at its annual meeting in Barbados on 28-29 October 2015. 3. The 2016 EOIR Terms of Reference introduces a requirement that beneficial ownership information be available for EOIR purposes in respect of legal persons (e.g. companies, foundations, Anstalt and limited liability partnerships) and legal arrangements (e.g. trusts). The 2016 EOIR Terms of Reference remain based on 2002 Model TIEA, but now refer to the 2012 version of Article 26 of the Model Tax Convention and Commentary, which clarifies, amongst others, that requests on a group of taxpayers not individually identified (“group requests”) are covered under Article 26 of the Model Tax Convention, as long as the foreseeable relevance is sufficiently demonstrated. Other improvements have been introduced regarding the coverage of enforcement measures and record retention periods, foreign companies, rights and safeguards, and the completeness and quality of EOI requests and responses. 4. The first round of reviews was a great success with 125 jurisdictions being assessed and a total of more than 250 reports (phase 1, phase 2 or combined) published in the period 2010-16. Final ratings for [X] jurisdictions were adopted. During the first round of reviews, the reports have shown that the volume of requests has grown substantially – by some estimates more than 60 per cent. The use of EOIR is expected to increase following the implementation of AEOI, as AEOI will serve as a detection tool and EOIR will be required to build up cases against non-compliant taxpayers.
OECD WORK ON TAXATION 2018-2019. Tax is at the heart of our societies. A well-functioning tax system is the foundation stone of the citizen-state relationship, establishing powerful links based on accountability and responsibility. It is also critical for inclusive growth and for sustainable development, providing governments with the resources to invest in infrastructure, education, health, and social protection systems. Across the whole range of policy issues facing governments today, tax finds itself playing a central role, whether it is about collecting sufficient resources to fund the infrastructure of a society or acting as a policy lever to reflect attitudes and choices about such diverse areas as climate change, gender equality, education, health. The OECD and its Centre for Tax Policy and Administration have worked tirelessly to shepherd these issues and provide a focal point for an inclusive conversation that leads to world class standards and effective implementation, always recognising the full range of contexts and constraints faced by countries. We have achieved great success in tackling tax evasion through the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (which has more than 150 members) – it is estimated that by June 2018, jurisdictions around the globe have identified EUR 93 billion in additional revenue (tax, interest, penalties) as a result of voluntary compliance mechanisms and other offshore investigations put in place since 2009. Moreover, the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project now has over 115 members in its BEPS Inclusive Framework, all working together to ensure that tax is paid where value is created. In the midst of this great transformation of the international tax environment taxpayers and governments raised the issue of uncertainty in tax matters from the perspective of businesses and tax administrations. In response to the call from G20 Leaders, the OECD and the IMF have produced a report identifying the sources of uncertainty in tax matters. The OECD is working with governments to develop tools to promote greater tax certainty in order to to provide a stable environment that will foster economic growth. These gains, however, need to be cemented and new challenges are emerging that demand even greater emphasis on the collaborative environment we have fostered, whether this is about the digitalisation of the economy, promoting domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries or using tax policy to advance important social goals such as climate change, gender equality or healthier communities. I look forward to our tax work continuing to deliver tangible results, and co-operating with other international and regional organisations to help governments create the resilient, stable and sustainable environment needed for more inclusive growth.
OECD Taxation Working Papers N. 39. SIMPLIFIED REGISTRATION AND COLLECTION MECHANISMS FOR TAXPAYERS THAT ARE NOT LOCATED IN THE JURISDICTION OF TAXATION. A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT
OECD Taxation Working Papers N. 39. SIMPLIFIED REGISTRATION AND COLLECTION MECHANISMS FOR TAXPAYERS THAT ARE NOT LOCATED IN THE JURISDICTION OF TAXATION. A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT. This paper discusses how the key challenge for jurisdictions seeking to exercise their taxing rights over taxpayers that are not located in the jurisdiction of taxation can be addressed by the use of simplified registration and collection mechanisms. The problem considered by this report – how to collect tax from taxpayers that are not located in the jurisdiction of taxation – is a problem encountered by any tax regime where the jurisdiction asserts taxing rights over a tax base but this jurisdiction has limited power to compel the taxpayer to remit the tax. Although the experience of jurisdictions in addressing this problem has involved primarily consumption taxes, in particular value added taxes (VAT) and retail sales taxes (RST), that experience (and the lessons that can be learned from it) is applicable as well to other tax regimes, whether involving direct or indirect taxes, that confront the same problem. This paper considers two principal approaches to addressing the problem: · Jurisdictions may seek to enlist some other participant involved in the transaction or activity that generates the tax base over which it asserts taxing rights, and over whom it does have enforcement authority to collect the tax or otherwise satisfy the taxpayer’s compliance obligation (e.g., withholding taxes). To this regard, it is shown that, although customers and intermediaries can, in some circumstances, play an important role in the collection of the tax (for example the business customer located in the taxing jurisdiction in the context of a business-to-business transaction or e-commerce marketplaces in the context of business-to-final consumer digital sales), they may be much less efficient in other contexts. Indeed, according to the OECD work (the International VAT/GST Guidelines and the BEPS Action 1 Report Addressing the Challenges of the Digital Economy), customer collection is generally regarded as an inappropriate approach to indirect tax collection in the business-to-consumer (B2C) context given its low level of compliance and its associated costs of enforcement. For analogous reasons, it is also generally recognised that withholding taxes (for example on payment as part of options to address the broader direct tax challenges of the digital economy) are not an effective mechanism for tax collection in the B2C context. · As an alternative, jurisdictions may adopt a taxpayer registration and collection mechanism, and, in light of the absence of enforcement authority over the taxpayer, may seek to make compliance sufficiently easy or attractive to induce taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations. The paper then reviews the simplified registration and collection regimes that jurisdictions have implemented or are about to implement. It is generally recognised that this alternative is more appropriate in the B2C context. Many jurisdictions have implemented (and are in the process of implementing) simplified registration and collection regimes in the B2C context for taxpayers that are not located in the jurisdiction of taxation in the VAT and RST area. Although the evidence regarding the performance of the simplified regimes adopted by jurisdictions is still quite limited, because these regimes generally have only become operational on a widespread basis recently, the best available evidence shows that these simplified regimes work well in practice. According to the most significant experience i.e. the experience in the European Union, a high level of compliance can be achieved and substantial levels of revenue can be collected since there is a concentration of the overwhelming proportion of the revenues at stake in a relatively small proportion of large businesses and since the compliance burden has been reduced as far as possible. Against that background, it is highly likely that an even greater number of jurisdictions will embrace simplified collection regimes in the future, especially in light of the growth of the digital economy and more particularly, B2C digital transactions. In the VAT area, simplified registration and collection mechanisms issues are dealt with in the International VAT/GST Guidelines and the Report on Mechanisms for the Effective Collection of VAT/GST. This paper also notes that compliance costs for small and micro-businesses can be relatively high compared to the proportion of revenues collected from such businesses and that the adoption of thresholds may be an appropriate solution to avoid imposing such a disproportionate administrative burden in light of the relatively modest amount of revenues at stake. It also points out that a good communications strategy is essential to the success of a simplified regime (including appropriate lead-time for implementation). The exchange of information and international administrative co-operation should also play a significant role in both encouraging taxpayers to comply and detecting non-compliance. Hellerstein, W., S. Buydens and D. Koulouri (2018).
OECD/UNDP – TAX INSPECTORS WITHOUT BORDERS. ANNUAL REPORT 2017/18. This Annual Report from Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) covers the period May 2017 to April 2018. TIWB’s practical and results-oriented approach to supporting domestic resource mobilisation is proving increasingly relevant in a fast moving international environment. TIWB is contributing to the United Nations’ Financing for Development agenda, and supporting progress towards attaining the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is also underpinning the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) actions, strengthening developing countries ability to effectively tax multinational enterprises (MNEs), while offering increased certainty and predictability to taxpayers. TIWB increasingly operates in close partnership with a diverse range of stakeholders and partners. Demand for TIWB is growing. There are 29 programmes currently operational and 7 have been completed, together exceeding the target of 35 programmes by April 2018 set by the TIWB Governing Board. Over 20 programmes are in the pipeline. New South-South opportunities are being identified, with India, Nigeria, and South Africa now offering expertise. These developments are, in part, due to increased active participation from Partner Administrations (those providing experts), with 11 countries deploying their serving tax officials and a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) managed roster of 40 tax audit experts up and running. To date, USD 414 million in increased tax revenues is attributable to TIWB and TIWB-style support offered in partnership with the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) and the World Bank Group (WBG). TIWB represents excellent value for money with over USD 100 in additional tax revenues recovered for every USD 1 spent on operating costs. Whilst revenue impact is important, in the last year TIWB has gathered evidence of other long-term outcomes, including on skills transfer, organisational change and taxpayer compliance. The TIWB Secretariat has developed new tools to help with the measurement challenge. In 2017, an Experts’ Roundtable and a Stakeholders’ Workshop, involving stakeholders from 28 countries and 6 international and regional organisations, gathered lessons on how TIWB’s unique role could be strengthened and how the target of 100 tax expert deployments by 2020 should best be achieved. A mentorship programme was proposed. Other lessons include the finding that TIWB programmes with full access to taxpayer information have advantages over anonymised case reviews and can help with tax reforms by illuminating possible legislative shortcomings in international taxation. The importance of a whole-of-government approach by Partner Administrations, which could improve the efficiency of expert deployment processes with institutionalised funding arrangements, was also highlighted. The partnership between the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and UNDP, which delivers TIWB, is becoming stronger with an agreed division of labour. UNDP country offices are able to facilitate national-level discussions on domestic resource mobilisation (DRM), raise awareness and build national support for TIWB programmes. The TIWB Secretariat has launched its first e-newsletter and community of practice for its Experts. TIWB has also updated its multilingual website. The year ahead will see the TIWB Secretariat pursue the implementation of the 2016- 2019 Objectives (Annex A). Priorities will include cementing partnerships with regional tax organisations, expanding the scope of TIWB to new areas such as tax and crime, continuing to build South-South programmes and building a pool of industry expertise to assist developing countries address audit challenges in key business sectors. A major international conference on TIWB and possible future directions is being considered for 2019.
OECD – EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING
OECD – EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING. 1. The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (the Convention) is one of the outcomes of the OECD/G20 Project to tackle Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (the “BEPS Project”) i.e. tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity, resulting in little or no overall corporate tax being paid. 2. The BEPS Action Plan was developed by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) and endorsed by the G20 Leaders in September 2013. It identified 15 actions to address base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) in a comprehensive manner, and set out deadlines to implement those actions. Action 15 of the BEPS Action Plan provided for an analysis of the possible development of a multilateral instrument to implement tax treaty related BEPS measures “to enable jurisdictions that wish to do so to implement measures developed in the course of the work on BEPS and amend bilateral tax treaties”. 3. After two years of work, the CFA, including all OECD and G20 countries working on an equal footing, produced the Final BEPS Package, which was endorsed by the OECD Council and the G20 Leaders in November 2015. The Final BEPS Package, in the form of reports on each of the 15 actions accompanied by an Explanatory Statement, gives countries and economies the tools they need to ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities generating the profits are performed and where value is created, while at the same time giving businesses greater certainty by reducing disputes over the application of international tax rules and standardising compliance requirements. It was agreed that a number of the BEPS measures are minimum standards, meaning that countries have agreed that the standard must be implemented. 4. Implementation of the Final BEPS Package will require changes to model tax conventions, as well as to the bilateral tax treaties based on those model conventions. The sheer number of bilateral treaties (more than 3000) would make bilateral updates to the treaty network burdensome and time-consuming, limiting the effectiveness of multilateral efforts.